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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an explosion of civil rights lawsuits brought by prisoners
over the past three decades. From just a few hundred in the 1960s to more than
33,000, prisoner lawsuits accounted for fifteen percent of all civil suits filed in
the federal courts in 1993.1 The burden is particularly heavy in state courts,
where civil rights suits are filed by inmates of state prisons who do not have to
exhaust grievance processes before filing suit, a limit imposed upon federal
prisoners.2
While prisoners may cry, "alas, the mutinous ship of unconstitutionality
has sailed in the harbor of my rights once more," 3 the truth is that most filings
by prisoners are frivolous.4 Suits range from charges of cruel and unusual
punishment for allowing a prisoner's ice cream to melt, 5 and similar charges
1 Ashley Dunn, F7ood of Prisoner Rights Suits Brings Effort to Linit Filings, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1994, at Al.
2 Dunn, supra note 1, at B4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1988) (providing that
federal courts may require prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before having their
claims heard in court).
3 Elizabeth Rhodes, Lone Warrior for Justice?-Jailhouse Lawyer's Filings Brought
Special Ruing by Supreme Court, SEATrLE TIMas, May 20, 1991, at Al.
4 Michael 1. Mueller, Note, Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts: Proposals
for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 93, 102 n.30 (1984); see also Michael Noone
McCarty, Limitation of State Prisoners' Ovil Rights Suits in the Federal Courts, 27 CATH.
U. L. REv. 115, 116-17 (1977) (discussing the temptation of prisoners bringing actions in
forma pauperis to file frivolous or malicious lawsuits).
5 Dunn, supra note 1, at Al. Courts have generally held that punishment for an offense
is cruel and unusual if there is a gross disparity between the offense committed and the
punishment imposed for more serious offenses, see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), or where the proportionality of the punishment to the crime is so disproportionate as
to shock the sense of justice. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). "[While prison
clonditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment... to the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861,
861 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)), vacated and
remanded, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). It is difficult to believe that a claim alleging cruel and
unusual punishment for allowing an inmate's ice cream to melt could be brought in good
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for receiving creamy peanut butter instead of crunchy, 6 to a three-year battle in
which a prisoner claimed a conspiracy by the Arizona State Department of
Corrections to bombard him with lasers, ultrasound, and microwaves in order
to send him subliminal messages, all (he alleged) in violation of his civil
rights.7
A number of prisoners filing frivolous claims are "career plaintiffs"8 who
abuse the courts to pursue illegitimate goals.9 Many are driven by a desire to
further personal vendettas or to show contempt and disrespect for the legal
system; 10 others have fundamental personality and mental health problems;11
and still others are simply bored.' 2 Whatever their motivations, the result has
faith.
6 See Dunn, supra note 1, at B4. For additional commentary, see Steven Fromm,
Jailhouse Lanyers: A Growth Industry, NEWJERsEYLAw., Oct. 17, 1994, at 1.
7 Pamela Manson & Karen Kaplan, Prisoners' Suits over Trifles Jam U.S. Courts,
State CZdamr, ARizONA REPUBLIC, July 18, 1993, at B1. Other bizarre examples of prisoner
litigation include the case of a federal prisoner who declared himself president of the
fictitious "Olympian Nation" and applied for diplomatic relations with the United States-
thereby, he alleged, entitling him to diplomatic immunity for his crime. When immunity
was denied, the prisoner declared himself persona non grata and demanded that he be
expelled from the United States. When that was denied, the "President of the Olympian
Nation" declared war on the judge. Laura Blumenfeld, Case Dismissed! Those Loopy
Lawsuits; Nothing Cogs the Wheels of Justice Like a Lost Cause, WAsH. POST, Aug. 30,
1991, at C4. Additionally, a prisoner who represented himself filed a $5 trillion suit against
the Attorney General of Texas, calculating his attorney fees at $100,000 an hour. The
prisoner asked officials to deposit half of the money in his trust fund and give the rest to his
mother. He also enclosed deposit slips for the court's convenience. Id.
8 Mueller, supra note 4, at 104.
9 Id.; see, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[G]reen has
deliberately flooded the courts with his complaints and petitions (and encouraged other
prisoner churchmembers to do the same), in a vain attempt to gain his release from
prison.").
10 Mueller, supra note 4, at 107; see, e.g., Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("IT]he bulk of Carter's filings represent a number of lengthy
private wars and vendettas which Carter has carried out at no monetary expense to himself
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.").
11 Mueller, supra note 4, at 109; see, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256
57 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing several cases involving Anthony R. Martin-Trigona in which his
personality was questioned), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).12 See Jonathan C. Rose & David K. Karp, Congress' Inaction to Blame for Federal
Court Back/og, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1984, at 14, 21; see also In re Martin-Trigona, 573
F. Supp. 1245, 1253 (D. Conn. 1983) ("His career in court establishes that, for him, legal
trouble is a veritable sport, a means of making life challenging and enjoyable."), aff'd in
part, vacated in part and remanded, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S.
1061 (1986).
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been backlogged courts and an enormous expense to the taxpayers. 13 A
balancing must take place between protecting prisoners' rights to access the
civil courts, and protecting the courts and government defendants from the
necessity of processing frivolous claims and defending against abusive litigation
tactics. The result must be fair, uniform, and effective.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the phenomenon of frivolous
prisoner litigation. Part II describes this problem and Part HI looks at
prisoners' rights to access the court system and various judicial approaches
which have limited these rights when frivolous prisoner litigation has become
abusive. Included in Part Ill is a brief discussion of why these judicial
responses have not been adequate in remedying the problem of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits. Part IV describes the increasing demand for legislation to
address the difficulties of multiple, frivolous filings by prisoners and examines
legislation proposed in Ohio to remedy the problem of frivolous prisoner
litigation. Part V then analyzes this legislation under the United States
Constitution.
I. ABUsIVE PRISONER LITIGATION
Federal courts have defined frivolous lawsuits in light of a number of
policy concerns. 14 The term "frivolous" is generally defined as "without
arguable substance in law and in fact." 15
13 See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Every lawsuit
filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the investment of court time, whether
the complaint is reviewed intitially by a law clerk, a staff attorney, a magistrate, or the
judge."); see also infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
14 Stephen M. Feldman sets forth six policy factors considered by the federal courts:
First, an enormous number of in forma pauperis complaints are filed, and the vast
majority of these are meritless. Second, unlike paying plaintiffs, in forma pauperis
plaintiffs have no economic disincentives to filing meritless claims. Third, in forma
pauperis claims are a drain on public funds and judicial resources. Fourth, in forma
pauperis plaintiffs who are also prisoners arguably have an incentive to file meritless
claims: they might get a trip to the courthouse. Fifth, allowing meritless claims of
prisoners to progress through the judicial system is likely to undermine the authority of
prison officials and interfere with prison discipline. Finally, as a matter of comity, the
federal courts should avoid conflicts with state authorities by minimizing the instances
where they tell state authorities how to manage state prisons.
Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute-
Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413,419-20 (1985).
15 Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); see aso Franklin v. Murphy,
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Although not all frivolous suits should be categorized as "abusive," nor
should every plaintiff who files a frivolous, indefinite, or meritless complaint
be labeled an "abusive litigant,"' 6 frivolous suits may become abusive when
filed repeatedly by the same individual. 17 Robert Procup is a prime example of
an abusive prisoner litigant because "the court can conservatively estimate that
Procup has himself filed in excess of 300 lawsuits within the past few years.
Furthermore, that total does not include the cases in which [he] has acted as a
'law clerk' for various other inmates."' 8 Similarly, Reverend Clovis Carl
Green, Jr. would qualify as an abusive prisoner litigant, 19 having filed over
745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984) (adopting the holding of Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d
886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976) that in determining if a complaint is frivolous the court must make
"an assessment of the claim presented, i.e., is there a factual and legal basis, of
constitutional dimension, for the asserted wrong, however inartfully pleaded."); Crisafi v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a complaint is frivolous if there is no
factual or legal basis for remedy of the asserted wrong and no claim upon which relief can
be granted by the court); Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d
812, 815 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The test of legal frivolity is whether a plaintiff can make a
rational argument on the law and facts in support of his claim.") (citing Bennett v. Passic,
545 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1976)). But see Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th
Cir. 1983) (affirming the standard set forth in Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592, 594 (6th Cir.
1983) that if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would
entitle him to relief, the action is frivolous and may be dismissed).
16 See Howard F. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Proi'on
of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. LJ. 417, 419, 438, 440 (1993). Eisenberg suggests that in some
cases, to the prisoner, the claims are not frivolous.
"[Flrivolity" is viewed only from the point of view of the court, and not from
the viewpoint of the prisoner when, in fact, the inmate may have very different
objectives in filing suit. Many prisoners file suit because the prison administration
had dealt with them in some arbitrary, irrational, bureaucratic, or dehumanizing
manner, even when no constitutional-or even legal-right is involved.
Eisenberg also suggests that for some prisoners the ability to file suits is therapeutic,
and access to the courts operates as an important safety valve. Id.17 Mueller, supra note 4, at 102 n.30.
18 Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 150 51 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev'd, 760 F.2d
1107 (11th Cir. 1985). Prisoners, such as Procup, who assist other prisoners in writing and
filing complaints are often referred to as "jail-house lawyers" or "writ writers." Green v.
Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd sub nom. In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247,
1251 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Green, 428 F. Supp. at 736 ("[D]espite the experience of having filed
'hundreds' of lawsuits, petitioner consistently and deliberately has failed to follow the
proper procedures and rules for filing actions in this Court.").
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550 complaints in the federal and state courts. 20 Likewise, Anthony R. Martin-
Trigona, a pro se litigant, who has filed more than 250 civil actions, appeals,
and other matters in less than a decade,21 would be considered an abusive
prisoner litigant. "The purpose, nature and effect of Anthony R. Martin-
Trigona's career in litigation is simply to multiply litigation . . . . Martin-
Trigona has managed to have a significant malign effect on judicial
administration to the prejudice of others seeking justice .... " 22 And the list of
abusive prisoner litigants continues.23
As one court has noted, prisoner litigants often possess several advantages
over ordinary litigants. These include: "time to draft multiple and prolonged
pleadings; ability to proceed in forma pauperis and thus escape any financial
obstacles confronting the usual litigant; and availability of free materials which
the state must provide the prisoner, including paper and postage." 24 While a
staggering ninety-seven percent of the 33,000 prisoner lawsuits filed in federal
courts in 1993 were dismissed before trial, and only thirteen percent of those
that continued resulted in any success for the prisoners-the worst rate of any
type of civil suit filed in the federal courts25-it was not without a great
expense of precious court time,26 and considerable expense to taxpayers. 27
20 See Green v. Arnold, 512 F. Supp. 650, 651 (W.D. Tex. 1981); see also In re
Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("Clovis Carl Green is in all
likelihood the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history."); Green v. Camper, 477
F. Supp. 758, 759 68 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (listing over 500 cases and noting that Green has
also drafted hundreds of complaints on behalf of other inmates).
21 See In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1261 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part,
vacated in part and remanded, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986).
22 Id. at 1264 65.
23 See, e.g., Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or. 1983) (plaintiff
claimed to have more than 140 pending lawsuits); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 946 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (noting that Albert Carter, as a pro se litigant, is known to have
filed over 178 cases).
24 Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (1lth Cir. 1986).
25 Dunn, supra note 1, at Al.
26 See supra note 13 (citing Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071). In the one-year period ending
June 30, 1993, 1,652 federal lawsuits were filed by prisoners in New York State. Dunn,
supra note 1, at Al. That total was exceeded by Texas, California, Missouri, and Florida.
Id. The New York Attorney General estimated that his office had a backlog of 28,000
prisoner lawsuits and stated: "This has become the single most prolific source of litigation.
It's a major burden on us." ld. at B4. Similarly, an assistant Arizona attorney general
estimates that inmates have filed nearly half of the cases pending in federal courts in
Arizona, stating: "That means 16,000 prisoners file as many cases as 3.4 million law-
abiding Arizonians." Manson & Kaplan, supra note 7, at B1. He further stated: "Only one
to two percent of prisoner litigation is legitimate with the rest amounting to 'recreational
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Must the courts stand by, helplessly subjected to the barrage of frivolous
lawsuits? The answer, ultimately, is no.
m. PRISONERS AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Prisoners' Rights to Access the Courts
Prisoners undoubtedly have a right to access the courts. 28 While this right
is not absolute, as the Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith stated, access must be
"adequate, effective and meaningful." 29 The Court in Bounds noted that the
right of access imposes an affirmative duty on prison officials to assist inmates
in preparing and filing legal papers, either by establishing a law library or by
providing adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. 30 Prison officials
are not required to provide both, however, as long as access is meaningfud. 31
Many prisoners access the courts through in forma pauperis petitions.32
litigation.'" Id. For additional description of several problems which result from multiple
frivolous prisoner lawsuits, see Mueller, supra note 4, at 113. Mueller describes:
The most apparent effect of excessive litigation is the imposition of unnecessary
burdens on adjudicators and useless consumption of court resources. As caseloads
increase, judges have less time to devote to each case. A lack of adequate time for
reflection threatens the quality of justice. Second, long delays in adjudication create
public dissatisfaction and frustration with the courts .... Fourth, allowing abusive
litigation to go unchecked allows prolonged harassment of defendants.
Id.
2 7 See John Sanko, Norton Calls for Laws to Quash Frivolous Lawsidts, ROCKY
MouiTAiN NEWS, Aug. 30, 1994, at 8A (the Arizona Attorney General's Office spent
5,580 hours on frivolous lawsuits last year at a cost of $242,000).2 8 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 828 (1977) (holding that prisoners
have fundamental constitutional rights to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to
courts to challenge violations of constitutional rights); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485
(1969) (prisoners' rights of access to courts may not be denied or obstructed). But see
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 839-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the "'fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts' ... is found nowhere in the Constitution....
ITrhe 'fundamental constitutional rights... ' which the Court announces today is created
virtually out of whole cloth with little or no reference to the Constitution from which it is
supposed to be derived."); id. at 833-34 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (quoting the majority
opinion). For further discussion see Feldman, supra note 14, at 432-36.
29 430 U.S. at 822.30 Id. at 828.
31 See id. at 832.
32 In forma pauperis means "in the character or manner of a pauper." Alexander
[V/ol. 57:257
FRIVOLOUS PRISONER ITIGATIO N
The main provision of the modem in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a), enables a litigant to file a civil suit without paying a filing fee.33
However, court permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of
privilege and not of right, and denial of in forma pauperis status does not
violate the applicants' rights to due process. 34
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint "if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 35 The
discretionary controls contained in this provision enable a court to dismiss an
action sua sponte "if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the
action is frivolous or malicious." 36
In defining the purpose of § 1915(d), the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
O'Connell v. Mason3 7 stressed the responsibility of courts to ensure a
reasonable, good faith use of the in forma pauperis statute:
It is quite clear that Congress, while intending to extend to poor and
meritorious suitors the privilege of having their wrongs redressed without the
ordinary burdens of litigation, at the same time intended to safeguard members
of the public against an abuse of the privilege by evil-minded persons who
might avail themselves of the shield of "immunity from costs" for the purpose
Wohl, Barred from Cour: Some Observers Worded by Justices' Rejection of Indigent
Petitions, 80 ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 44. For a discussion of in forma pauperis filings, see
Feldman, supra note 14; William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner
Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Cowts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 610 (1979).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1982). That section provides:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution
or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that
he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the
nature of the action, defense or appeal and affmant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
ld. A person must ordinarily pay a filing fee of $120 before filing a civil action. See 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1982).
3 4 See Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.) ("In connection with in forma
pauperis proceedings... the benefits are entirely statutory, they are granted as a privilege
and not as a matter of right. The refusal to grant is not a violation of due process."), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); see also Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th
Cir. 1969) ("There is no absolute right to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in civil
matters; rather it is a privilege extended to those unable to pay filing fees when the action is
not frivolous or malicious.").
35 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
36 Carter v. Telectron, 452 F. Supp. 944, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
37 132 F. 245 (1st Cir. 1904).
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of harassing those with whom they were not in accord, by subjecting them to
vexatious and frivolous legal proceedings. 38
Thus, while prisoners are entitled to meaningful access to the courts, 39 this
right may be curbed when it is abused. 40 In addition to dismissing frivolous
claims sua sponte under the in forma pauperis statute, courts have employed a
number of other techniques in an attempt to remedy the problem of abusive
prisoner litigation.
B. Judicial Attempts to Remedy Abusive Prisoner Litigation
Courts have taken numerous approaches in attempting to alleviate the
problem of multiple filings of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. 41 "In devising
methods to attain the objective of curtailing such prisoner activity, however,
courts must carefully observe the fine line between legitimate restraints and
impermissible restrictions on prisoners' constitutional right to access the
courts."
42
One method courts have used to inhibit multiple and repetitious prisoner
filings of frivolous claims is to enjoin litigants from litigating specific claims,
or claims arising from the same set of factual circumstances, similar to res
judicata, or issue and claim preclusion. 43 Recognizing that "plaintiffs clearly
possess no constitutional right to harass the court and state officials with
malicious lawsuits" 44 courts rely on the power given by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
"to enjoin litigants who are abusing the court system," 45 and those "litigants
38 Id. at 247.
39 See supra note 28.
40 For examples of abusive prisoner litigation see supra notes 18 23 and
accompanying text.
41 The court in Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) lists several of
the methods courts have employed to curtail frivolous prisoner litigation. Id. at 1071. For
additional analysis of judicial responses to abusive prisoner litigation, see Mueller, supra
note 4, at 124 63.
42
,Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071.
43 See Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(affirming the district court's injunction).
44 Hill v. Estelle, 423 F. Supp. 690, 694 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 543 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1976).
45 Harrelson, 613 F.2d at 116; see also In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir.
1979) (en banc) ("In view of Green's continued abuse this court orders that no further
petitions for writs of mandamus may be filed in this court by the petitioner challenging the
regularity of proceedings in the district court.").
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who are using the courts as a stage for their vendetta of harassment. " 46
This method, however, may be limited in effectuating its intent because
most career plaintiffs, like Martin-Trigona, Procup, and Franklin, are
proficient at changing dates, names, and other facts to avoid these
injunctions.47 It is often difficult to detect relitigation of previous claims due to
the expansive volume of claims filed and the constant changing of named
defendants by prisoners attempting to escape the confines of the injunctions.48
As they search for a solution to the problem of frivolous prisoner litigation,
some courts have ordered litigants to seek leave of the court before filing
pleadings in any new or pending lawsuit;49 others have directed litigants to
attach a list of any pleadings previously filed involving the same, similar, or
related causes of action to all future complaints and have required litigants to
46 Hill, 423 F. Supp. at 694.
47 Mueller, supra note 4, at 128 n.169; see also In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp.
1245, 1265 (D. Conn. 1983) (nationwide injunctive relief, an extraordinary remedy,
ordered as appropriate "where principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
powerless to stem the tide of litigation."), affd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 737
F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Procup v. Strickland, 567 F.
Supp. 146, 154 (M.D. Fla. 1983) ("Procup advances approximately five or six different
types of claims in which only the names of the wrongdoers and the dates on which the
wrong was supposedly perpetrated have been changed... this tactic makes it difficult for
the Court to effectuate wholesale consolidation of his cases."), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th
Cir. 1985); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or. 1983) ("It is well within
the broad scope of... 28 U.S.C. § 1651, for a district court to issue an order restricting
the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose manifold complaints raise claims identical or
similar to those that have already been adjudicated .... But this type of order would not
significantly deter Franklin because his claims are more often ridiculous than repetitive.").
48 See, e.g., Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[A]
pro se litigant, devious enough in most instances to avoid more expedient remedies such as
res judicata... or the across-the-board imposition of a bar against further legal proceedings
once the merits of an action have been determined... can successfully prolong a cause of
action through a series of autonomous courts and utilize tactics designed to harass both
courts and defendants, all at public expense.").
4 9 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Gatta, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Urban
v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam); In re Martin-
Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Green v.
Warden, 699 F.2d 364,370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960 (1983); In re Green, 669
F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see also Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d
735, 737 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985) (while not
imposing an injunction in this particular case, the court recognized the power of courts to
enter injunctions and to "impose conditions upon a litigant-even onerous conditions-so
long as they.., are.., not so burdensome as to deny the litigant meaningful access to the
courts.").
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send an extra copy of each pleading filed to the law clerk of the chief judge.50
These methods, however, are not efficient enough to remedy the enormous
magnitude of frivolous prisoner litigation. It is difficult to determine if a
prisoner has complied with the mandates of this proposed solution since an
enjoining court cannot know every court in which the prisoner plaintiff files
subsequent complaints. 51 Furthermore, the varied standards for granting leave
to file within the different courts prohibits a uniform application of the
strictures of this remedy across judicial realms.52
Courts have also required accompanying affidavits with all future claims
being raised, certifying that the claims are new-having never before been
raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal court-in an attempt to deal
with vexatious and repetitious filings. This approach includes a criminal
contempt of court charge for failure to certify or upon false certification.53 This
method, however, has also had minimal impact on the problem of abusive
prisoner litigation. First, it is difficult to implement a system which verifies the
validity of prisoner affidavits which purport to certify the validity of a claim.
50 See, e.g., Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
51 See Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 768 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1979) ("These five
hundred plus cases do not include any of the uncounted hundreds of cases inmate Green has
filed under the name or ostensibly on behalf of other inmates. While he is enjoined from
writ writing in the Western District of Missouri, he continues to engage in writ writing in
other jurisdictions."); see also In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245, 1265 (D. Conn.
1983) ("[Mlartin-Trigona has not been encumbered in his litigation by geographical
boundries. He has been an active litigant in, among others, courts in Massachusettes,
Connecticut, New York, the District of Columbia, and Illinois."), aff'd in part, vacated in
part and remanded, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
944, 947, 989 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[Ihe de-centralized and uncoordinated court system has
been an easy target for a litigant who, although schooled in law, lacks requisite good faith in
implementing its use .... Carter thrives on the lack of communication and coordination
between courts which, given their autonomous nature and the necessary focus on their own
heavy caseload, generally remain unaware of the activities and experiences of other courts,
even other court units within the same unit."); Mueller, supra note 4, at 139.
52 Mueller, supra note 4, at 138.
53 See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 369-70 (7th Cir.) (m making the order the
court noted: "The requirement that he certiiy to the novelty of his claims (which is distinct
from actually proving them) can hardly be described as burdensome and is necessary in
light of the avalanche of pleadings, petitions, and other papers of Green's that have deluged
the courts."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960 (1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (while noting the severity of the order, the court, frustrated by the
frivolous filings, stated: "[Wle are saying point-blank that if he continues to show his
contempt for the orderly judicial process, the process will accord him further [prison] time
as summarily as the law allows."); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Wash.
1982).
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This is due to the great volume of claims filed and the creativity of prisoners in
altering the faces of the documents but not the substance of the claims filed.54
Second, prisoners ineligible for parole for many years are not likely to be
deterred by the threat of a contempt of court sentence for falsifying affidavits. 55
More drastic approaches have been taken by courts to limit the filing of in
forma pauperis claims by abusive prisoner plaintiff; to those who allege actual
or threatened physical harm, and to require payment of a filing fee to bring
other claims.56 In particular, this was a remedy to which some courts resorted
in attempting to deal with the litigious Reverend Clovis Green.57 Courts have
held, however, that the legitimacy of a total ban on all in forma pauperis filings
by a particular litigant as a sanction for abusive filings is questionable.58
Additionally, limiting claims to only those who allege actual or threatened
physical harms poses other problems which prevent it from being a valid
solution. First, it is an onerous response which establishes presumptions of
frivolity in subsequent suits. 59 This is subversive of the congressional intent
behind 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to provide indigents with a case-by-case analysis
comparable to that provided to more affluent plaintiffs. 60 Also, abusive
prisoner plaintiffs can disarm the effect of these restrictions by simply including
allegations of physical harms in future complaints. 61 Further, while limiting the
54 See supra notes 46 47 and accompanying text.
55 See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 159 & n.12 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (noting
that the Reverend Clovis Carl Green, Jr., originally sentenced to a ten-year imprisonment
term for rape, continued his numerous legal activities for other prisoners despite receiving
several criminal contempt sentences for violating an injunction against writ-writing, and that
it would be unlikely that Procup, serving a sentence of life in prison, would be deterred by a
contempt of court charge), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1107 (1lth Cir. 1985).
56 See Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 56 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
57 See id.
5 8 See Abdullah v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating that
such an order is overbroad, but may be cured by requiring plaintiff to seek leave of the
district court before filing such actions); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th
Cir. 1984) (directing the district court to amend its order to "avoid the constitutionally
questionable conclusive presumption that all of Franklin's subsequent submissions are
frivolous or malicious."); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735, 736 37 (10th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (holding that the district court's order of requiring the full payment of filing
fees unduly impaired the appellant's right to access the court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161
(1985); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (rejecting the district
court's order directing the clerk not to file any further papers submitted by Green, but
supporting the notion that courts are nonetheless entitled to take severe action when
warranted).
59 See In re Green, 669 F.2d at 786.6 0 Mueller, supra note 4, at 146.
61 See, e.g., Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 n.13 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
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privileges of the in forma pauperis statute will sometimes be usefulI, 62 it will
not deter prisoners who pay their own filing fees and other costs while
bombarding the court system with abusive filings. 63
Finally, some courts have attempted to remedy the problem of abusive
prisoner litigation through use of their injunctive powers, by limiting the
number of filings allowed by particular inmates, 64 or entering injunctions
against abusive prisoners acting as jail-house lawyers for other inmates. 65
However, limiting jail-house lawyering could lead to challenges involving the
First Amendment right to association. 66 Additionally, as previously noted,
injunctions limiting the number of claims allowed to be filed can be overbroad
in scope. 67 Finally, injunctions leave the courts with the difficult task of
("This proposal would be an open invitation for Procup to proceed apace with this abuse of
the system by including the "magic" allegation of physical injury to his person."), rev'd,
760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or.
1983) ("It would not take long before all of Franklin's complaints 'would allege some type
of physical harm and of course, all would be of a constitutional magnitude.'") (quoting
Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 34 (E.D. Wash. 1982)).62 See Mueller, supra note 4, at 143.
63 See, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd in part,
vacated in part and remanded, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the district court
and court of appeals had repeatedly denied Martin-Trigona's permission to proceed in
forma pauperis for failing to state facts in supporting affidavit sufficient to demonstrate
indingency).
64 See Franklin, 563 F. Supp. at 1334 (limiting the prisoner to six in forma pauperis
filings per year).
65 See Hanson v. Goodwin, 432 F. Supp. 853, 853 (W.D. Wash.), appeal diwnised,
566 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1977) (ordering that "plaintiffs shall not advise, counsel, or assist in
any way any other person to commence such lawsuit or other legal proceeding"); Green v.
Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (Green was perpetually enjoined and
restrained from acting as a "writ writer" or "jailhouse lawyer."), afid sub nom. In re
Green, 586 F.2d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922 (1979).
66 Mueller, supra note 4, at 133; see U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally NAACP v.
Buttons, 371 U.S. 415 (first Supreme Court case holding that the right of access to the
courts protects activities of political and social organizations).
67 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. But see Franklin v. Murphy, 745
F.2d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984) (in approving the district court's injunction, the court of
appeals imposed the following qualification: "If a request is made for the filing of additional
cases beyond the number prescribed by the court, Franklin must be afforded an opportunity
to make a showing that the limitation to six filings is prejudicial because inclusion of these
claims by amendment of his existing claims is not possible. If such a showing is made, the
district court must amend its order. This will avoid the constitutionally questionable
conclusive presumption that all of Franklin's subsequent submissions are frivolous or
malicious.").
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monitoring prisoner filing activities;68 and there are those prisoners who will
blatantly defy such injunctive orders. 69
Although this list of judicial remedies is not exhaustive, 70 it is extensive
and illustrates two fundamental problems with judicial remedies. First, despite
the extensive number of judicial remedies available, courts are unable to master
the fundamental problem of abusive prisoner litigation alone. While some
restraints are legitimate, these restraints are often ineffective at offering a broad
solution to the problem; other restraints are either ineffective, or of
questionable constitutionality. Second, the judicial remedies are not uniform;
application of the varied remedies leads to inconsistencies in both results and
prisoners' expectations of the court system. A solution is needed which offers
broad coverage, uniformity in application, and an effective result.
IV. REMEDYING FRiVOLOUS PRISONER LITIGATION THROUGH
LEGISLATION
A. The Need for Legislation to Protect Courts from Frivolous Prisoner
Litigation
Despite attempted judicial remedies, the problem of multiple filings of
frivolous claims by prisoners has not been alleviated. In Ohio alone, it cost the
Attorney General's Office more than $1.35 million to defend the State against
more than 600 inmate civil lawsuits in 1993, and this figure does not include the
costs incurred by the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections for such
things as gathering documents and transporting inmates to court.71 In fact, the
68 Mueller, supra note 4, at 132.
69 See, e.g., Green v. Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 768 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1979) ("While
he is enjoined from writ writing in the Western District of Missouri, [Green] continues to
engage in writ writing in other jurisdictions.").
70 The Procup court notes that other restrictions that might be considered include:
limiting the number of pages to a complaint and other pleadings; requiring a plaintiff to file
an affidavit setting forth what attempts he has made to obtain an attorney to represent him;
and limiting further pleadings without order of the court, after the complaint has been filed.
792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986). For further discussion of these, and other judicial
remedies, see Mueller, supra note 4, at 125 63.
71 Hearings on S.B. 261 Before the Ohio Senate Judiciary Criminal Justice Subconm.,
120th General Assembly (1994) (testimony of Bill Butler, Attorney General's Office)
[hereinafter "Butler Testimony" ] (copy on file with author). Senate Bill 261 and House Bill
679 were predecessors to the legislation currently pending in the Ohio legislature. These
proposed bills were virtually identical to current H.B. 455 and S.B. 196. See infra notes
88-111 for a discussion of the current legislation.
The cost of inmate litigation stems from several factors. First, the Department of
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number of these suits in Ohio nearly doubled from 1989 to 1993,72 and it was
estimated that at the end of 1995 there would be a 161 percent increase in the
number of such suits filed since 1989.73 The majority of these suits were
frivolous, 74 and many of the inmates filing suits were repeat litigants. 75
"While a few courts around the nation have limited a particular inmate's
ability to file endless frivolous suits, they do it infrequently and usually only
after such egregious behavior that thousands of taxpayers' dollars are already
spent." 76 Legislators have also approached the problem with caution,
recognizing that "all citizens, including prison inmates, are entitled to their day
Rehabilitation and Corrections employs a number of employees who are involved in
defending or preventing inmate litigation. Second, deposition expenses, copying expenses
and other expenses related to defending a case must be taken into consideration. Finally,
there is the expense of assistant attorneys general who are assigned to defend against inmate
litigation. Memorandum from Timothy J. Mangan, Chief, Criminal Justice Section, Ohio
Attorney General's Office, to Karen Romanoff, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Ohio
Attorney General's Office (Sept. 1, 1994) (copy on file with author).
72 Attorney General Lee Fisher, Fighting Frivolous Inmate Legislation, LAW & FACr,
July/Aug., 1994, at 6; see also Tim Bryant, Lawsuits: Court Here Is 3rd in U.S. in Imnate
i/W Rights Cases, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 1992, at IA, 5A (according to a
United States Courts administrative office, of 3,133 federal suits filed in Missouri in 1991,
1,172 were prisoner civil rights suits; in the U.S. District Court in Kansas City, 1,012 of
2,565 cases were prisoner civil rights suits; and in the Southern District of Illinois, prisoner
civil rights suits accounted for 481 out of 1,468 suits filed).
73 Hearings on H.B. 455 BeJore the House Judiciary and Criminal Justice Corm,
120th General Assembly (1995) (testimony of Representative Twyla Roman) [hereinafter
"Roman Testimony"] (copy on file with author).
74 See Memorandum from Bob Myers, Ohio Attorney General's Office, to Timothy J.
Mangan, Chief, Criminal Justice Section, Ohio Attorney General's Office (Aug. 25, 1994)
(copy on file with author).
75 As Kathleen McDonald O'Malley testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on proposed Senate Bill 261:
By way of example, in the past two years, one inmate at the Lebanon Correctional
Institute has filed over 35 suits. Another inmate at the Chillicothe Correctional Institute
has filed 35 suits and another at the Trumbull Correctional facility has filed 41 lawsuits.
To these prisoners and others, resort to our judicial system has become a hobby. And it
is a hobby with out [sic] cost or downside to those who chose to engage in it.
Hearings on S.B. 261 Before the Senate Judiciary Conm, 120th General Assembly (1994)
(testimony of First Assistant Attorney General Kathleen McDonald O'Malley) [hereinafter
"O'Malley Testimony"] (copy on file with author).
76 Id. (also stating that "Ithe courts in [Ohio] have been particularly loathe to choke
off even obviously abusive prisoner suits. We have been told that this is partially true
because the legislature has done nothing but encourage such actions.").
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in court" and that "over the years, civil rights suits have become a powerful
method to force improvements in prisoner medical care, legal access and
inmate treatment." 77 However,
[Clivil rights . . . have been severely compromised by the filing of an
unprecedented number of civil rights claims in our state prisons where the
claims are simply frivolous. The time and expense of litigating frivolous
lawsuits have diverted valuable and limited public resources from being
focused on meritorious claims and on providing better facilities and
rehabilitative opportunities throughout our prison system. 78
This fact has stirred several state legislatures, including Ohio's, to recognize
the magnitude of the problem and respond. 79
B. Ohio's Legislative Response to Abusive Prisoner Litigation: A Case
Study
Increasingly aware of the burden frivolous prisoner litigation was having
on the courts, Ohio public officials began in earnest, in the early 1990s to
arrive at a solution to the problem. These efforts eventually culminated in
House Bill 455,80 which was passed on November 15, 1995, and Senate Bill
196,81 which is currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This
legislation, drafted to discourage and deter frivolous prisoner litigation without
infringing upon the constitutional rights of prisoner litigants, is the result of a
lengthy undertaking.
In the first step towards developing remedial legislation, the Ohio Attorney
General's Office contacted judges around the state seeking their input and
ideas, and solicited other states for their help and insight.82 It soon became
clear from discussions with other states that ideas such as alternative dispute
resolution or grievance proceedings were not effective solutions. "Often, once
the inmate exhausted these internal remedies, the inmate filed a lawsuit with the
77 Fisher, supra note 72, at 6.
78 O'Malley Testimony, supra note 75.
79 See infra notes 80 86, 112-113 and accompanying text.
80 H.B. 455, 121st General Assembly (1995), available in OH-BLLTXT, Westlaw.
House Bill 455, "[establishes procedures for handling a civil action commenced against the
State or a State employee in a court of common pleas by an inmate; broadens the costs and
expenses that may be awarded for frivolous conduct in a civil action." H.B. 455, Synopsis,
available in OH-BILLTRK, Westlaw.
81 S.B. 196, 121st General Assembly (1995), available in OH-BILLTXT, Westlaw.
82 See Fisher, supra note 72.
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court anyway. The cost of managing these cases actually increased."8 3
Ohio also participated in a multi-state task force which addressed the issue
of frivolous and abusive prisoner litigation and considered legislative responses
to the problem.8 4 "The group worked with the understanding that it is
important to preserve and protect the rights of inmates to file and pursue
meritorious claims, while attempting to relieve the burden placed upon
Attorney General offices and other state and local offices by inmates who file
frivolous, non-meritorious lawsuits." 85 Attorneys general across the nation,
including former Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, unanimously passed a
resolution in support of the multi-state task force's drafts of model state and
federal legislation.86 The input from Ohio judges and the multi-state task force
model legislation provided the framework from which Ohio's legislation
developed.87
1. The Substance of Ohio House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196
Focusing on the fact that "there is no disincentive to inmates who wish to
file repeated lawsuits," 88 Attorney General Fisher emphasized that "[i]n our
justice system, fees and court costs serve an important function-they help
ensure that potential litigants consider whether their claims are truly worthy of
the courts' attention."89 This is the premise upon which proposed House Bill
455 and Senate Bill 196 are founded.
"The majority of inmates who file frivolous suits claim informa pauperis,
or pauper, status to avoid having to pay filing fees and attorney bills, costs
which the average citizen would have to pay." 90 The purpose of House Bill
455 and Senate Bill 196 is to hold inmates responsible for the court costs they
incur by requiring those with money in their inmate accounts91 to pay the filing
83 Id.
84 See O'Malley Testimony, supra note 75.
85 Id.
86 Butler Testimony, supra note 71.
87 See id.; Roman Testimony, supra note 73 (Representative Roman stated that the
National Association of Attorneys General model legislation "is the blueprint for House Bill
455.-).88 Fisher Announces Legislation to Minimize Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits, Press Release,
Office of Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher, issued on Feb. 17, 1994.
89 Id.
90 Roman Testimony, supra note 73.
91 Prisoner trust accounts are routinely maintained by prisons. Money earned through
convict labor, as well as funds sent into the institution by family and friends, is held in these
accounts for the individual prisoner's use. Eisenburg, supra note 16, at 480.
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fees92 from their prisoner accounts, and by subjecting them to court costs and
attorney's fees for frivolous conduct. 93
Under the legislation, the fees and costs would be collected by a gradual
withdrawal of funds from the prisoner litigant's account. 94 This process is to
apply notwithstanding a contrary poverty affidavit or any contrary court rule.95
If the inmate is to be released before the total fees owed are paid, the
appropriate officials are permitted to deduct from the inmate's account the
entire amount of fees owed or, if the account contains insufficient funds to
cover the entire amount owed, the court is permitted to take appropriate action
to otherwise secure payment.96
House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 provide for the imposition against the
prisoner litigant of court costs and attorney's fees 97 for frivolous conduct,98
92 In Ohio, filing fees are generally about $25 to sue the state in common pleas court.
Mary Beth Lane, Getting Tough with Inmates; Frivolous Lawsuits Irk Lawmakers, PLAIN
DEALER, Aug. 3, 1995, atB1.
93 See H.B. 455, § 2323.51(B)(1); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(B)(1).
94 See H.B. 455, § 2969.22; S.B. 196, § 2969.22, both providing in relevant part:
(A)(1) If an inmate commences a civil action against the State or a State employee
in a court of common pleas ... the clerk of the court of common pleas... shall accept
payment of the requisite fees from the inmate in the following manner ....
(a) The clerk shall notify the inmate of the deductions and procedures ....
(b) The clerk shall charge to the inmate at the time of commencement of the civil
action as a partial payment of the requisite fees or... the total payment of the requisite
fees an amount equal to the lesser of the requisite fees or twenty per cent of the average
monthly balance during the six calender months preceding the commencement of the
civil action of the finds in the inmate's account ....
(c) Unless the amount charged under division (A)(1)(b) of this section constitutes
the total amount of the requisite fees, during each calendar month following the month
in which the inmate commenced the civil action and until the total payment of the
requisite fees occurs, the clerk shall charge to the inmate an amount equal to twenty per
cent of the average monthly balance during the six preceding calendar months of the
funds in the inmate's account ....
Ld. A list of filing fees is provided in § 2303.20 of both bills. See H.B. 455, § 2303.20(A)-
CZ); S.B. 196, § 2303.20(A)-(Z).
95 H.B. 455, § 2969.22(A)(2); S.B. 196, § 2969.22(A)(2).
96 H.B. 455, § 2969.22(D); S.B. 196, § 2969.22(D).
97 H.B. 455, § 2323.51(B)(1); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(B)(1). Attorney's fees under the
statute equal:
The approximate amount of the compensation and, if any, the fringe benefits of the
Attorney General, an assistant attorney general, or special counsel appointed by the
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these costs and fees to be collected in the same manner as the filing fees. 99
Frivolous conduct is defined as:
(A)(2)(A) Conduct of a party to a civil action or of the party's counsel of
record that satisfies either of the following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party
in the civil action.
(ii) It is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.100
The bills also provide that a prisoner engages in frivolous conduct when
(1) the claim that is the basis of the civil action fails to state a claim; (2) it is
clear that the inmate cannot prove material facts in support of the claim; or (3)
the claim brought by the inmate is substantially similar to a claim previously
brought by the inmate because the previous and current claims involve the
same parties or arise from the same operative facts. 10 1
If the court ascertains that a prisoner's claim is frivolous or malicious12 it
may dismiss the action sua sponte. 103 An inmate who files a civil action has to
file with the court an affidavit or unsworn declaration describing each civil
action filed by the inmate in the previous year. 104 If the inmate has already
Attorney General that has been or will be paid by the state in connection with the legal
services that were rendered... in a civil action commenced against the State or a State
employee in a court of common pleas, including, but not limited to, a civil action
commenced by a pro se plaintiff who is an inmate, and that were necessitated by
frivolous conduct of the plaintiff, the counsel of record of the plaintiff, or the pro se
plaintiff.
H.B. 455, § 2323.51(A)(4); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(A)(4).
98 See H.B. 455, § 2323.51(B)(1); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(B)(1), providing in relevant
part: "[TIhe court may award court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other reasonable
expenses incurred in connection with the civil action to any party to the civil action who was
adversely affected by frivolous conduct."
99 See H.B. 455, § 2969.23(A)(1)(a)-(d); S.B. 196, § 2969.23(A)(1)(a)-(d).
100 H.B. 455, § 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)-(i); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)-(u).
101 H.B. 455, § 2323.51(A)(2)(b)(i)--(ii); S.B. 196, § 2323.51(A)(2)(b)(i)-(iii).
102 In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, a court may consider
whether (1) the claim fhils to state a claim; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or
fact; (3) it is clear the inmate cannot prove material facts in support of the claim; and (4) the
claim is substantially similar to a claim previously filed by the inmate. H.B. 455,
§ 2969.24B)(1)-(4); S.B. 196, § 2969.24(B)(1)-(4).
103 H.B. 455, § 2969.24(A)(2); S.B. 196, § 2969.24(A)(2).
104H.B. 455, § 2969. 25(A); S.B. 196, § 2969.25(A).
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filed three or more civil actions in the state during the preceding year, the court
must appoint an attorney to review the claim and make recommendations
regarding whether the claim is frivolous or malicious.1°5 This aids the court in
determining whether to dismiss the claim.10 6
In addition, a court will be permitted, either sua sponte or on the motion of
a party, to dismiss an action brought by an inmate if the inmate falsifies the
allegation of indigence in a poverty affidavit,107 or files an affidavit or unsworn
declaration that is false.' 08 And further, when inmates are awarded damages in
a successful civil action, the legislation does not permit the prisoners to escape
financial responsibility for the wrongs they have committed. Courts are
required to order that the following be deducted on a pro rata basis from a
prisoner's damages award:
(A) any fine imposed upon the inmate for an offense for which the inmate
is confined;
(B) any court costs taxed to the inmate for the trial in which the inmate
was convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense for which the inmate is
confined;
(C) any court ordered restitution imposed upon the inmate relative to an
offense for which the inmate is confined. 19
Finally, prisoners whose claims are subject to the grievance system in the
state correctional facilities in which they are imprisoned must exhaust the
grievance procedures before bringing suit in court."10 If the prisoner brings suit
in court after thirty days following the prisoner's receiving the decision from
the grievance procedings, the court must dismiss the prisoner's civil action."'I
Thus, the legislation is drafted to filter out those lawsuits which are
frivolous and malicious before they burden courts' dockets and to deter
prisoners from becoming abusive litigants. It imposes upon >.'c~ners the same
responsibilities as others filing suit in the court system by imposing filing fees,
as well as court costs and attorney fees, when appropriate. Further, it holds
prisoners accountable for their interactions with Ohio's justice system.
105 H.B. 455, § 2969.25(B); S.B. 196, § 2969.25(B).
106 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (listing the factors considered by the
courts in deciding whether to dismiss because the claim is frivolous or malicious).
107 H.B. 455, § 2969.24(A)(1); S.B. 196, § 2969.24(A)(1).
108 H.B. 455, § 2969.24(A)(3); S.B. 196, § 2969.24(A)(3).
109 H.B. 455, § 2969.27(A)-(C); S.B. 196, § 2969.27(A)-(C).
1 10 H.B 455, § 2969.26(A)-(D), S.B. 196, § 2969.26(A)-(D).
I11 H.B 455, § 2969.26(A)-(D), S.B. 196, § 2969.26(A)-(D).
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2. A Critique of Ohio's Legislation
Arizona has already passed legislation, similar to Ohio's House Bill 455
and Senate Bill 196, that requires a filing fee,112 and many other states are
considering the same type of disincentive." 13 There are skeptics who question
the effect of such legislation saying: "The problem is that if they don't have
any money in their accounts, then we still have to pay for it."114 However, this
legislative approach has already proven to have a significant impact on prisoner
litigation. Statistics from the Northern District of New York succinctly
illustrate this point. Between 1983 and 1985, the Northern District of New
York experienced an annual increase of twenty prisoner cases per year. 115
Using that figure, the projected estimate of cases to be filed in 1992 was 707
suits if the trend had been permitted to continue. 116 However, the imposition of
a filing fee in 1985 resulted in only 383 of the projected 707 cases being filed
in 1992, roughly forty-seven percent fewer cases than the predicted number. 117
Additionally, Arizona experienced a thirty-five percent drop in filings during
the year in which its filing fee legislation was enacted. 1 8 These figures inspire
hope that similar results will attain in those states proposing legislation that
imposes similar filing fee requirements.
Ohio's legislative approach has received support from various sectors of
1 12 See ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 12-306 (1995).
113 See, e.g., 1995 AK H.B. 201, 19th Legislature, (1995-96) (unless exceptional
circumstances exist, prisoner may not commence litigation against the state unless the
prisoner has paid in full the filing fees); 1995 NH H.B. 532, Regular Session (1995-96),
1995 NH S.B. 6, Regular Session (1995-96) (prisoners who file civil suits shall pay twenty
percent of preceding month's income from inmate trust account towards court fees and,
thereafter, ten percent of preceding month's income towards court costs); 1995 NY A.B.
8381, 218th General Assembly, Regular Session (1995-96), 1995 NY S.B. 4408, 218th
General Assembly, Regular Session (1995-96) (prisoners shall be required to pay amount
equal to ten percent of the preceding three months inmate account unless special
circumstances exist); 1995 SC H.B. 4371, Statewide Session (1995-96), 1995 SC S.B. 950,
Statewide Session (1995-96) (prisoners bringing civil actions shall pay partial payment of
any filing fees required of twenty percent of the preceding six months income and,
thereafter, monthly payments of ten percent of the preceding month's income).
114 See Kevin Lawrence Williams, Prisoners aog Courts with Suits; Bill Seeks to
Curtail Frivolous Complaints, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 11, 1994, at 10B (quoting Captain
Frank Leonbruno, administrative supervisor, Lake County jail).
115 Butler Testimony, supra note 71.
116 d.1171Id.
I218 Roman Testimony, supra note 73.
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the judicial and criminal justice systems.1 19 However, there are those who raise
valid questions about the necessity and probable impact of the legislation. One
question posed is "whether legislation is necessary to deal with the problem,
since it would appear that the courts have sufficient authority in their rule
making power." 120 While it is true that courts do have broad rule making
power and authority to take judicial initiatives to remedy the problem,1 21 this
has not eliminated the need for legislation addressing the issue. First, many of
the judicial remedies cannot significantly effect frivolous prisoner litigation on
a system-wide basis, 122 and many are ineffective even with respect to a single
abusive prisoner litigant. 123 Secondly, while a few judges nobly try to address
the situation, 124 the majority are apprehensive about taking an active role
without some guidance from the legislature. 125
Another question regarding the necessity for remedial legislation is raised
by those who suggest that the problem of frivolous lawsuits exists primarily in
the federal system.126 However, statistics provided by the Ohio Attorney
General's Office indicate that, while the majority of prisoner lawsuits in Ohio
have been filed in federal court, the number of cases filed in Ohio's state courts
is hardly insignificant.1 27 Of the 586 new prisoner inmate cases filed in 1993 in
119 See, e.g., Letter from Judge Dana A. Deshler, Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth
Appellate District, to Senator Betty Montgomery (May 16, 1994) ("This letter is sent in
support of passage of S.B. 261 ... regarding frivolous pro se litigation. Something must be
done to free various courts of junk litigation. I believe Sen. Watts' bill is a step in the right
direction.") (copy on file with author); Letter from Gary Haines, Montgomery County
Sheriff, to Representative Wayne Jones (March 24, 1994) ("[1] was pleased to see that you
and the Attorney General support legislation that would restrict the ability of inmates to file
frivolous suits.") (copy on file with author).
120 Letter from P. Daniel Fedders, Presiding Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Warren
County, to Lee D. Fisher, Ohio Attorney General (March 17, 1994) (copy on fie with
author).
121 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., Letter from P. Daniel Fedders, supra note 120 ("[1] am enclosing
herewith a copy of our Rule of Court that we recently implemented to deal with the
problem. The staff workers at the two institutions [penitentiaries located in Warren County]
assure me that this procedure poses no difficulties for them.").
125 See Butler Testimony, supra note 71 (discussing the results of canvassing judges
around the state about their ideas on the abusive prisoner litigation problem); see also
Roman Testimony, supra note 73 ("There are current standards for dismissal of cases, but
many judges are reluctant to dismiss.").
126 See, e.g., Letter from Senator Bruce Johnson to Richard Cordray, Attorney
General's Office (Sept. 2, 1994) (copy on file with author).
127 Memorandum from Timothy J. Mangan, Chief, Criminal Justice Section, Ohio
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Ohio, 246 were filed in state court and 340 were filed in federal court. 128
Thus, approximately forty-two percent of Ohio civil inmate litigation was filed
in state court and fifty-eight percent was filed in federal court. Furthermore, of
the 401 cases filed in Ohio from January 1994, through September 1994, 164
(forty percent) were filed in state court, and 237 (sixty percent) were filed in
federal court. 129 Although these statistics support the notion that the majority of
cases are filed in federal court, they also reveal that a significant number are
being filed in Ohio's state courts as well.
Despite the number of cases being brought in both the state and federal
courts, some still believe that such bills are unnecessary "because
administrative rules dispose of most cases when the prisoner has not filed the
appropriate fee."130 Furthermore, it is argued that the administrative burdens
of creating a method for prisoners to pay court costs would only add
problems. 131 These are very persuasive arguments against the proposed
legislation, but equally persuasive is the fact that many judges are reluctant to
dismiss prisoner lawsuits 132 and that, although most prisoner inmate suits are
ultimately dismissed, it is not before they consume massive amounts of time
and money. 133 For instance, as previously mentioned, even though the majority
of prisoner civil suits were dismissed in 1993, it still cost the Ohio Attorney
General's office more that $1.35 million to defend the state against more than
Attorney General's Office, to Karen Romanoff, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Ohio
Attorney's Office (Sept. 1, 1994) (copy on file with the author).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Hearings on S.B. 261 Before the Senate Crirninal Justice Subcomm., 120th General
Assembly (1994) (testimony of Miles Durfey, Clerk, Court of Claims) (Durfey stated that
the court had 700 inmate cases filed in 1993. Most of these (440) were from the Lucasville
riots to recover loss of property. Only three were large judicial cases and the others were
handled administratively.).
131 Id. (Durfey asserted that it would take over six years to collect a $25 filing fee
from prisoners making $3 per month, and that 90 percent of the prison cases are filed by
nonindigents); see also Howard Mintz, No Pay, No Play; A Federal Court Drowning in
Prisoners' Petitions Is Watching the Fate of One Docket-Clearing Plan-Requiring Inmates
to Pay All or Part of the Filing Fees, RECORDER, July 23, 1993, at 1 (reporting concerns
expressed by Ira Robbins, a law professor at American University, about prisoners paying a
portion of the filing fees. Professor Robbins stated: "Is this going to stem the tide of prison
litigation? I don't think so. It may take more time to figure out how much a prisoner should
pay than it does to decide one of these cases.").
132 Roman Testimony, supra note 73.
133 See supra notes 13, 26-27 and accompanying text; see also Blumenfeld, supra note
7 (reporting that, even when a case is dismissed, the court still must research and write up
the legal justification).
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600 civil inmate lawsuits.134 The imposition of filing fees, as proposed in the
Ohio legislation, has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of
prisoner civil lawsuits filed elsewhere. 135 A similar result of the enactment of
the proposed Ohio legislation would be that the additional problems pointed out
by critics would be curbed as the number of prisoner lawsuits decreased.
Likewise, the ultimate costs in terms of time, money, and resources expended
in defending the frivolous lawsuits filed by the inmates would be significantly
reduced.
Overall, Ohio's legislation appears to be a viable way to "help stem the
tide of frivolous lawsuits filed by inmates over such issues as the seasoning in
their food, the location of the prison benches and the prompt delivery of
personal televisions." 136 However, before the final stamp of approval must be
given, the proposed legislation examined for constitutional difficulties.
V. HOUSE BiLL 455 AND SENATE BILL 196 UNDER THE UNTED STATES
CONSTITUTION 137
Statutes like Ohio House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 raise obvious
constitutional questions. These questions are: (1) whether this legislation
violates the First Amendment guarantee of the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances, 138 and (2) whether it violates equal protection and
due process. 139
13 4 Butler Testimony, supra note 71.
135 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
136 O'Malley Testimony, supra note 75.
13 7 The author concedes that the following discussion of the constitutional issues
involved with the proposed filing fee legislation is not exhaustive. For more in-depth
discussion of constitutional issues regarding court access, see generally Christopher E.
Austin, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the Right to Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 768;
Eisenberg, supra note 16; Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation: The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment Right to Petition the Government for A Redress of Grievances, 30 L. Ed. 2d 914
(1996).
138 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom... to petition the Government for redress of grievances.").
139 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1 (States may not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."). Federal Due Process is afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. ("No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
prcess .... "). U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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A. The First Amendment Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances
The Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that there is a right to
petition for redress of grievances by filing lawsuits. 140 These cases, while
relevant to the analysis, do not appear to threaten the Ohio legislation's
constitutional soundness.
Confronted with determinations of where an individual's freedom ends and
the State's power begins, the Court has noted that:
Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the
usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place
given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms
secured by the First Amendment. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity
and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. 141
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment
right to petition to preclude government imposed bars to the courts except in
"sham" situations. 142 This notion has been articulated through a series of
cases, establishing what has been called the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine.143
The first relevant case in the series was Eastern R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.144 In this private antitrust action it was alleged
that impermissible concerted efforts were at work to destroy competition by the
exertion of influence on the legislative and executive branches of the
government. 145 In response to the petitioner's request that such activities be
halted, the Court recognized that legislation 146 cannot be construed to prohibit
140 In general, these cases recognize the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances as a guarantee of the right to access the courts. See infra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text.
In another line of cases, the Court has found, through the guarantee of free association,
additional First Amendment protection for the right to litigate. These cases have relied upon
freedom of association to protect groups advising members of their legal rights and
referring them to lawyers. See, e.g., California Motor Tramp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972); NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Because Ohio's legislation
is directed towards the individual litigant acting alone, and does not implicate freedoms of
association, this line of cases will not be discussed further in this Note.
141 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529 (1945).
14 2 See infra notes 159-167 and accompanying text.
143 David Goldberger, First Amendment Constraints on the Award of Attorney's Fees
Against Ovil Rights Defendant-Intervenors: The Dilem of the Innocent Volunteer, 47
OmoST. L.J. 603, 615 (1986).
144 365 U.S. 127, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
145 Id. at 129-30.
146 The legislation at issue in Noerr was the Sherman Act. See id. at 133.
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two or more persons from associating in an attempt to solicit governmental
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws. 147 To do so would
be an abridgment of the right of petition, one of the freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights.148 The Court acknowledged that, while incidental injury might
be inflicted upon the opposition in a campaign for change which has been
rallied upon the government, such attempts to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws is nonetheless permissible and cannot be impeded. 149
The Court did, however, note an exception to this rule to be applied in
"sham" situations. Under circumstances in which "a publicity campaign,
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationship of a competitor," 150 justification will lie for an
application of the legislation which may preclude redress.' 51
In a second antitrust case, United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington,152 the Court followed its main holding in Noerr.153 It noted that
"Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent or purpose." 154 The Court concluded that such a
finding was necessary in order to preserve the informed operation of
governmental processes and to protect the right of petition guaranteed by the
First Amendment. 155
The next important development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine came inCalifornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,156 yet another antitrust
case. The Court applied the holdings of Noerr and Pennington and found that
the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. 157 The
Court thus concluded that access to the agencies and courts, like the legislature
and arms of the executive, cannot be denied. 158 In addition, the California
Motor Transport Court reiterated the limit, upon which the Noerr Court had
originally commented, which could permissibly be placed upon this right in
147 Id. at 130.
148 Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961).
149 Id. at 143-44.
150 Id. at 144.
151 Id.
152 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
153 See id. at 669-72.
154 Id. at 669-70.
155 Id. at 670.
156 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
157 Id. at 510.
158 Id. at 510-11.
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"sham" situations. 159 In such instances, "First Amendment rights may not be
used as the means or the pretext for achieving 'substantive evils' which the
legislature has the power to control." 160 Therefore, the Court concluded,
claims of the First Amendment right to petition under "sham" circumstances,
where harassment is the purpose, will not be provided immunity from
legislative action. 161
Finally, in Bill Johnson's Restaurant v. National Labor Relations
Board,162 the Court again, while recognizing the right to petition the courts for
redress of grievances, 163 emphasized that this right need not remain
unencumbered when a petition of the court is a "mere sham" for the purpose of
harassment. 164 In other words, suits based on insubstantial claims are not to be
afforded First Amendment protections. 165 The Court stated:
"The first amendment interests involved in private litigation-compensation for
violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, public
airing of disputed facts-are not advanced when the litigation is based on
intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims. Furthermore, since
sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it does not
come within the first amendment right to petition." 166
Through the cases discussed above, the Court has recognized a First
Amendment right to petition all branches of the Government, including the
judiciary, unimpeded by legislation, when there exist legitimate purposes for
seeking redress. This same right has not been extended to "sham" litigation. It
is in light, therefore, of the Court's development of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and subsequent cases, that Ohio's legislation must be scrutinized.
From an analysis of Ohio House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 under the
preceding First Amendment protective standards, it appears that these bills are
constitutionally sound. No impermissible restraint has been levied upon
prisoners seeking redress of their grievances through the judiciary. It is true
159 The Court expanded upon the "sham" theory to include circumstances in which the
"power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used to harass and deter respondents
in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them 'free and
unlimited access' to those tribunals." Id. at 511.
160 California Motor Transp. Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972).
161 Id. at 513.
162 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
163 Id. at 741.
164 Id. at 741-43.
165 Id. at 743.
166 Id. (quoting Thomas A. Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF.
L. REV. 39, 60 (1980)).
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that the legislation is drafted with aspirations of deterring frivolous litigation
that subverts precious court funds and time and thereby interferes with the
efficient administration of meritorious claims. But, it has been made clear by
the Supreme Court, through the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
that there are no First Amendment protections for such "sham" litigation.
Ohio's legislative goal of curbing frivolous prisoner filings while maintaining
judiciary access is, therefore, constitutionally legitimate and is accomplished in
several equally legitimate ways.
First, no absolute prohibition is placed on prisoners which impedes their
access to the courts for redress of legitimate grievances. Prisoners are entitled
to bring their civil actions to the doors of the courthouse, but payment of filing
fees will be required of those prisoners having money in their prisoner
accounts. 167 For the truly indigent, however, the Senate version of the bill
suggests that such fees may be waived. 168 Access is, therefore, at least under
the Senate version of the bill, available for those prisoners with or without
funds.
Secondly, the legislation is designed to ward off only frivolous or "sham"
litigation, which is not protected by the First Amendment. For instance, when
a claim has been brought against the State, the legislation requires that all
institutional internal grievance procedures be exhausted before a prisoner
brings it to court.169 In this way, frivolous claims are siphoned off before
clogging an already burdened court system. However, if dissatisfied with the
resolution of the grievance through the internal mechanisms, the prisoner may
commence a civil action in court for redress of his or her claim. 170 Therefore,
although additional steps may be required before access to the courts will be
available for certain types of civil claims, the legislation does not deny court
access. This applies as well to the provision requiring those prisoners filing
three or more suits in one year to have their claims reviewed by a court
appointed attorney for a determination of whether the new filing is meritorious.
If a legitimate claim is found to exist, then the path to the courthouse remains
clear for the prisoner to proceed. 171
Finally, for those prisoners wishing to file frivolous lawsuits, the
167 These funds are withdrawn on a gradual basis once suit has been filed, so even
prisoners with nominal funds in their accounts can pay the normal fees required to access
the courts for civil suits. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
168 Compare S.B. 196 § 2969.22(A)(2) ("This procedure applies notwithstanding a
contrary court rule.") with H.B. 455 § 2969.22(A)(2) ("This procedure applies
notwithstanding a contrary poverty affidavit or any contrary court rule.") (emphasis added).169 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
170 See H.B. 455, § 2969.26(A)-(C); S.B. 196, § 2969.26(A)-(C).
171 See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.
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legislation does not expressly forbid it. However, in addition to paying their
own filing fees, prisoners must be prepared to pay the court costs and
attorney's fees which will be charged to them for filings that are found to be
frivolous. 172 Such a requirement is not a "dubious intrusion" into the sanctity
of the First Amendment liberty to petition the government, since no First
Amendment right exists to file frivolous lawsuits. Overall, Ohio's legislation
does not place an absolute bar before prisoners seeking redress of their
grievances. What it does is place permissible restraints upon court access to
prisoners filing frivolous civil suits, in order to accomplish the legitimate state
goal of judicial efficiency. Deterring frivolous prisoner litigation is permissible
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and therefore, it seems that Ohio's
legislation is constitutionally sound under the First Amendment.
B. Equal Protection and Due Process
The Supreme Court has found a limited fundamental right to access the
courts.173 Because Ohio's legislation affects prisoners' access to the courts by
imposing filing fees on prisoners filing civil suits, it necessarily raises both
equal protection and due process considerations 174
"[The concepts of equal protection and due process stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." 175 The Supreme Court
has, thus, discussed the constitutionality of filing fee requirements necessary to
bring civil actions under both considerations. 176 Three cases in which the Court
172 See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
173 Feldman, supra note 14, at 433 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1976)). In
Bounds it was determined under a due process analysis that there must be meaningful access
to the courts. 830 U.S. at 821. It has also been suggested that a limited fundamental right to
access the courts has been developing under the First Amendment. See Carter v. University
of Washington, 536 P.2d 618, 623 n.4 (1975).
174 The equal protection and due process guarantees are found in the Fourteenth
Amendment which provides that, "No State ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1.
175 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 458 (1973) (Douglas, J., and Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
176 With respect to due process, it has been suggested that a procedural due process
analysis would not be triggered in filing fee cases. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 435-36.
This is based on the rationale that, in order to trigger a procedural due process analysis a
person must be deprived of "life, liberty, or property." Id. at 436. The Court has narrowly
defined these to those rights created by the states or specified in the Constitution, and,
although there is a fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts, different treatment
of indigents does not interfere with this. See id. On the other hand, Justice Douglas
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has undertaken such discussions are Boddie v. Connecticut,177 United States v.
Kras,178 and Ortwein v. Schwab.179 These cases indicate that, while the Court
is willing to afford the constitutional protections to court access when an
important societal interest, such as marriage, 180 is implicated, and no
alternative forum for resolution exists, 181 the Court does not feel it incumbent
to do so under all circumstances.
The first important holding came in Boddie,'182 in which court fees for
indigents seeking a divorce were challenged.' 83 The Court, applying a due
process analysis, 184 determined that due process prohibits a state from denying,
solely on the basis of inability to pay, access to its courts for the termination of
a marriage. 185
Critical to this determination were the facts that marriages involve interests
of basic importance to our society, 186 and that the state has a monopoly over
the ability to terminate marriages. 187 Under such circumstances, due process
requires at a minimum that "absent a countervailing state interest of overriding
significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 188
The Court, however, was explicit in limiting its holding to the facts of the
case before it, stating, "[w]e do not decide that access for all individuals to the
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed
suggested in Boddie that "[w]hatever residual element of substantive law the Due Process
Clause may still have, it essentially regulates procedure." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 384-85 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
177 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
178 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
179 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
180 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376.
181 Id. at 375-76.
18 2 Id. at 371.
183 Id. at 372-73.
184 Id. at 374-84. While the majority applied a due process analysis, other members of
the Court believed that it was equal protection which was triggered. Justice Douglas rested
his conclusion on equal protection rather than on due process. Id. at 386 (Douglas, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Brennan believed that this case implicated equal protection
considerations as well. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Finally, Justice Black
did not believe that the court costs were barred by either the Due Process Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 391-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 374.
186 Id. at 376.
187 Id. at 376-77.
188 Id. at 377.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURIVAL
beyond the reach of any individuals."' 89 It was this reservation that would
allow the Court to move away from its holding in subsequent cases.
In United States v. Kras,19° the Court again was confronted with the
constitutionality of a filing fee requirement. This time the petitioner, seeking
voluntary bankruptcy, challenged the requirement on Fifth Amendment
grounds. 191 Applying both equal protection and due process analyses, the
Court relied on the reservation previously stated in Boddie, to hold that the
filing fee requirement was constitutionally sound. 192 Effectively distinguishing
the facts of the two cases, the Court highlighted several factors supporting its
holding.
Regarding due process, the Court noted that, unlike in Boddie, the
judiciary was not the exclusive dispute-settlement technique in Kras. 193 Rather,
"in contrast with divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method available to a
debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditor." 194 Thus,
however unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, the fact that an
alternative remedy exists in theory is enough to distinguish Kras from
Boddie.195 Additionally, the Court found that the failure of Kras to obtain the
bankruptcy relief he was seeking would not materially alter his position in any
constitutional sense. 196 Stating that "[g]aining or not gaining a discharge will
effect no change with respect to basic necessities, " 197 the Court thus found
there was no due process violation. 198
Similarly, the Court found that the filing fee requirement in no way denied
Kras equal protection of the laws. 199 It observed that "bankruptcy is hardly
189 Id. at 382-83.
190 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
191 Id. at 435.
192 Id. at 442-47.
193 Id. at 443-46.
194 Id. at 445.
195 Id. at 445-46.
196 Id. at 445.
197 Id.
19 8 Id.
199 Id. An equal protection analysis focuses on whether suspect classifications (race,
religion, or alienage) or fundamental rights (those rights which have their source and are
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the federal Constitution) are involved. See Felix v.
Miliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (E.D. Mich. 1978). If a fundamental interest or a
suspect class is implicated, the government must have a compelling interest in order to
prevail against the strict scrutiny analysis the Court will undertake. Id. Where no
fundamental right and no suspect class have been implicated, the Court will consider
whether the government has a rational basis for the law in determining its legitimacy. See
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 302 (1976) ("Unless a classification trammels
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akin to free speech or marriage or those other rights, so many of which are
imbedded in the First Amendment, that the Court has come to regard as
fundamental and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling
governmental interest before they may be significantly regulated." 200
Furthermore, as no suspect criteria of race, nationality, or alienage was touched
upon,201 the Government merely had to show a rational justification for
imposing the requirement. 2°2
The same equal protection analysis was applied by the Court in Ortwein v.
Schwab.203 In Ortwein the appellants challenged the constitutionality of a
twenty-five dollar filing fee required to appeal to the state appellate court an
agency determination which reduced their welfare payments. 204
Relying on the reasoning of Kras,205 the Court determined that the filing
fee requirement was constitutional. 2°6 First, the appellants had been provided
alternatives to the judicial remedy which were not conditioned on the payment
of fees. 207 Secondly, no suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or
alienage, was present.208 Consequently, the applicable standard of review was
rational justification.20 9 Rational justification was found by the Court on the
basis that the generated fees helped offset operating costs of the court, were not
disproportionate, and were an effective means to accomplish the state's goal. 210
Of course, the previously discussed cases did not involve prisoners.
Prisoners, particularly poor prisoners, have traditionally been afforded great
fundamental personal ights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race,
religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory
discrimination and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.").
200 Kraus, 409 U.S. at 445.
201 Id. Wealth, or the lack thereof, has not been used to determine the existence of a
suspect class. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("[A]t
least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages.").
202 Id. The Court determined that such a rational justification was presented in Kras.
The finding of a rational justification was supported by the historical congressional power
over bankruptcy, existing bankruptcy laws, such as the automatic stay, which protect the
debtor, and the incidental effect of the fees which make the bankruptcy system self-
sufficient. Kraus, 409 U.S. at 447-49.
203 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973).
204 Id. at 656.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 665.
207 In this case, the appellants had pretermination evidentiary hearings. See id. at 659.
208 Id. at 660.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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protections by the Court against discrimination in criminal trials.211 However,
the Court has "studiously and carefully refrained from saying one word or
sentence suggesting that the rule . . . announced to control the rights of
criminal defendants would control in the quite different field of civil cases." 212
Moreover, "[o]ur Federal Constitution... does not place such private disputes
on the same high level as it places criminal trials and punishments." 213
Therefore, it is probable that, if called upon, the Court will apply a similar
analysis to that which it undertook in Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein, to determine
the constitutionality of filing fees affecting court access in prisoners' civil suits.
Ohio House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 would, most likely, withstand any
such constitutional examination. First, although the Court has recognized a
limited fundamental right to access the courts, no liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution is being denied or unconstitutionally impaired by the legislation.
Alternatives to the judicial remedy for claims against the State are provided
which are not conditioned on the payment of fees, 214 and court access for other
meritorious claims remains essentially unimpeded. 215
Furthermore, no suspect class has been discriminated against by the
legislation. While it may be argued that the overall impact of legislation
requiring payment of filing fees if a prisoner has funds in his prison account
discriminates against poorer pro se prisoner litigants, wealth, or the lack
thereof, has not been recognized as suspect classification. 216 Additionally,
under Ohio's legislation, truly indigent prisoners may have the fees waived.217
And for other prisoners, this legislation merely holds them to the same
responsibilities as other citizens. As one judge on the Washington Supreme
Court approvingly commented on filing fees, private disputes, and
accountability of the individual litigant:
It seems unjust to me... to direct the expenditure of public money for purely
private purposes. Plaintiff here brings this case to vindicate a private wrong;
the avails, if any, will inure wholly to her exclusively for her personal benefit
211 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 390 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that indigent convicted defendants
have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be represented by counsel
during the appellate process); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that indigent
defendants in criminal cases must be afforded the same rights to appeal their convictions as
are afforded to defendants who have ample finds to pay their own costs).
2 12 Bodde, 401 U.S. at 390 (citing Gnffin, 351 U.S. at 12).
213 Id. at 390.
2 14 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 94-95, and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 201.
217 See supra note 168.
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in recovery of her personal claim or demand. This litigation has already cost
the public far more than the amount in controversy. Speaking ofjustice, I think
it an injustice that one person be afforded privileges and immunities at public
expense not available to all persons under like conditions.
... Court costs and attorney fees in private actions simply do not rank with
food, shelter and medical care and necessary transportation as among the
responsibilities which the public has thus far assumed.2 18
Because no fundamental right or suspect class is unduly burdened or
discriminated against, Ohio's legislation must have merely a rational
justification.219 A rational justification can be found in the State's desire to
curb the frivolous prisoner filings that burden Ohio's court dockets and impede
the efficient administration of justice for meritorious claims. 220 Therefore, it
appears that Ohio House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 would successfully
withstand any equal protection or due process challenge.
218 Iverson v. Marine Bancorporation, 517 P.2d 197, 200-01 (1973) (the court found,
after reviewing Boddie, Kras, and OrtAvein, no due process or equal protection violations
resulting from denial of motions to appeal civil suit without cost).
219 See supra note 199.
220 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of frivolous
prisoner litigation in Ohio).
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V. CONCLUSION
Increasing public attention has been given to the problematic issue of
frivolous prisoner litigation. 221 Pressure has been placed not only upon state
legislatures, 222 but upon Congress as well, 223 and both the state and federal
governments are starting to respond. Ohio legislators have not turned their
backs on this problem, but have risen to the challenge presented by frivolous
prisoner litigation. House Bill 455 and Senate Bill 196 constitute Ohio's
attempt to stem the tide of burdensome, frivolous prisoner litigation flooding
Ohio courts today. These bills provide uniformity, and, as has been
demonstrated by legislation elsewhere, they will broadly and effectively
discourage frivolous filings by prisoners. This legislation will make significant
in-roads towards alleviating the problems created by frivolous prisoner
litigation.
221 From television, see, e.g., The Great Prison Pastime; Frivolous Lawsuits, 20/20
(ABC television broadcast, July 29, 1994), to newspapers, see e.g., Duann, supra note 1;
Manson & Kaplan, supra note 7, the public, through mass media, is becoming increasingly
aware of the problem of frivolous prisoner litigation.
222 See supra notes 80-86, 112-13, and accompanying text.
2 23 See Gregory C. Baumann, Curran Seeks Federal Curbs on Frivolous Inmate Suits:
Curran, Cief Law Enforcers from Nine Other States, Win Pledge from Senator Hatch to
Sponsor Bill to Stem Tde of Meritless but Expensive Claims, DAILY RECORD, Aug. 2, 1995,
at 1; see also Senators Dole, Harry Reid, Orrin Hatch and Others Hold News Conference on
Legislation Concerning Prisoner Lawsuits, News Conference, FDCH Political Transcripts
(Wash., D.C., Sept. 27, 1995).
[Vol. 57:257
